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1. Introduction 
Dating from at least the time of Adam Smith, academics have sought to develop a “theory of 
the firm” that is sufficiently general enough to capture all of the manifestly different forms into 
which individuals (voluntarily) organise their transactions. Such a theory would also explain 
governance arrangements used to both set the ‘firm’s’1 strategy and agenda, and monitor and 
enforce the performance of those charged with carrying it out. It could also point to the most 
appropriate external monitoring for certain organisational forms.   
Much of the early historic research on the agency theory of the firm and the related 
governance arrangements derives from Berle & Means’s (1937) separation of ownership and 
control, and the management of the ensuing moral hazard risks.  More recently Grossman & 
Hart’s (1986) incomplete contracting theories is used as a means of explaining the observed 
nexus between the boundaries of a firm, the identity of its owners and the allocation of both 
formal and informal control rights (Aghion, Bloom & Van Reenen, 2014; Bolton, 2014; 
Gibbons & Roberts, 2012).  At the core of theories based upon both agency and incomplete 
contracting concepts is the bundling (either ex ante or ex post) of ownership of residual assets 
and income streams with the ability to exercise residual control rights (Dessein, 2014).  
Yet, firms with nonstandard ownership arrangements, such as non-profits and co-
operatives, have always engaged in economically significant activities, and are assuming 
growing importance in the policy context (Hansmann, 2008; 2012).  Their distinguishing 
feature is that, to some degree or other, they compromise the fundamental nexus between 
residual ownership and the exercise of control rights upon which most theories of the firm are 
                                                     
1  In this paper we take a broad view of what constitutes ‘the firm’ extending from for-profit organisations to those with a non-
profit or mission-based focus, including cooperatives.  
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predicated.  Governments – which exhibit arguably the most nonstandard models of ownership 
and control allocation (Moe, 2012) – are experimenting with a range of different institutional 
arrangements for delivering taxpayer-funded services, and the contracts to fund and hold these 
nonstandard entities (e.g. State-Owned Enterprises – Kowalski, Büge & Sztajerowska, 2013; 
Public-Private Partnerships - Iossa & Martimort, 2015).   Contracting-out of government-
funded health care to non-profit firms or collectives of independent practitioners affiliated as 
provider co-operatives is a prominent example (Howell & Cordery, 2013).    
The growing interest in nonstandard entities (see Sacchetti and Tortia, 2015; Thornton 
and Cave, 2010) begs the question of how parties seeking to interact with them should structure 
their transactions, and how the firms themselves and their stakeholders should seek to structure 
governance arrangements so as to achieve their individual and joint best possible outcomes. 
Policy-makers and regulators also need to be aware of the efficiency consequences of these 
arrangements (Kanaya et al., 2015; Thornton and Cave, 2010).    
However, these firms have not featured prominently in theory of the firm research.  
Gibbons & Roberts (2012, pp 6-7) observe: “legislatures,  government bureaus and 
departments, the courts, political parties, clubs, co-operatives, mutual, family firms, state-
owned enterprises, charities and not-for-profits, hospitals, universities and schools all … 
deserve more attention than they have received’ in Organizational Economics (OE) research. 
In part, this may be a function of the novelty of the OE approach, which to date has provided a 
number of basic qualitative insights, but has yet to link “ownership or integration decisions to 
variables that can be quantified … (or)… provide a framework for identification” (Aghion, et 
al. (2014, p 10). In similar vein, Bolton (2014, p 77) observes the lack of simple quantifiable 
methodologies for making agency, limited commitment, information and control theories 
“more operational”.  But if it has so far proved difficult to operationalize quantitative OE 
research on standard shareholder-owned firms, how can we even begin to apply the conceptual 
insights of this literature to firms with nonstandard ownership forms?  
 This paper rises to the challenge posed by OE researchers from the positive perspective 
of identifying how, in nonstandard firms, elements of residual ownership and control are 
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precluded from being bundled into a single decision-maker. Nonstandard firms are 
distinguished from firms integrating residual ownership and control that have to date 
characterised OE research. We do not replicate prior normative pursuits of an optimal scope of 
integration of activities to define the boundaries of a firm. Rather, we systematically identify 
and catalogue these differences as a first step towards rendering tractable for empirical analysis, 
the extremes of heterogeneity and complexity observed in practice.  Drawing upon both agency 
and incomplete contracting theories, we develop a multi-dimensional taxonomy classifying the 
allocation of residual ownership and control rights that is sufficiently broad enough to 
encompass both standard shareholder-owned and non-standard firms. The taxonomy can then 
be used both in case study analysis of the artefacts influencing decisions in individual firms, as 
a basis for classifying firms for much broader comparative empirical analysis and for testing 
hypotheses.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we survey the literature on the theory of 
the firm, and how it has been applied to provide insights into firms with nonstandard 
relationships between residual ownership and control. Drawing on that literature we then 
develop the taxonomy of dimensions along which the differences between standard 
shareholder-owned firms and firms with nonstandard ownership arrangements might be 
expected to lead to materially different contractual options and outcomes (see Figure 3).  In 
Section 4, we demonstrate the use of the taxonomy to highlight important differences between 
standard shareholder-owned firms, supplier-owned co-operatives and classic non-profit 
charities in the New Zealand primary health care sector. We illustrate how important ownership 
and control differences between co-operatives and the charitable trusts indicate the need for 
different contractual arrangements, both within the firms’ governance structures and, 
importantly, in external government contracts for service provision. Section 5 concludes by 
identifying how the taxonomy can be used for future empirical research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 A Contractual Foundation? 
Historic theories of the firm are agency-based and derive from Berle & Means (1937). Yet, 
most modern economics-based theories derive from Ronald Coase’s (1937) seminal paper 
characterising the firm’s boundaries as delineated by transactional exchanges outside the 
market. He argued that activities would be undertaken within a firm whenever the costs of using 
markets were greater than the costs of using direct authority. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
instigated a new line of inquiry into the nature of contracts within the firm in proposing that 
when there is joint input or team production, the firm offers a more cost-effective means of 
monitoring.  
Whilst agreeing that contractual exchange within firms was important, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) found Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) emphasis on monitoring too restrictive, 
calling for a more nuanced theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognised that most 
organisations are legal fictions serving as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals, as owners of labour, material, or capital inputs, or as consumers of output. They 
therefore postulated that the firm’s behaviour will reflect how the conflicting objectives of those 
individuals play out via contractual relations: in particular, the costs of agency (arising when 
the interests of the agent (manager) diverge from those of the principal (owner)), and the costs 
of risk-bearing associated with the ways by which the owners of capital (debt or equity) supply.  
Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) advanced the theory further, to explain the existence 
of firms where there were no defined equity owners. These ‘non-owned’ – or non-profit – firms 
are characterised by the ‘non-distribution constraint’ prohibiting distribution of the firm’s 
residual earnings to the (vested) interests exercising control over its decision making 
(Hansmann, 1980).  The non-distribution constraint unbundles the residual control and residual 
risk-bearing functions of shareholder-owned firms. They contended that in all firms, decision-
making occurs through structures separating ratification and monitoring of decisions 
(“governance”) from initiating and implementing the decisions (“management”). In a non-
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profit firm, separating the decision management from decision control can offer greater 
assurances to donors and beneficiaries that decision managers will be constrained against 
misappropriation of resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  
Fama and Jensen (1983b) also applied their framework to professional partnerships and 
mutual structures. Decision control in a mutual, where customers are the residual risk bearers, 
can be exercised by each claim holder redeeming his/her claim. Partnerships eschew the 
shielding of limited liability associated with shareholder-owned firms, but nonetheless rely 
upon the partners being residual claimants to discipline decision-making. Fama and Jensen’s 
distinction between the elements of decision management and decision control drew into sharp 
relief the need for aligning the various agency contracts to the various pecuniary interests of 
the residual risk bearers.  
In contrast, however, Hansmann (1996) contended that firm’s owners will be those 
stakeholders (‘patrons’) with the lowest combined costs of ownership and market contracting. 
Ownership costs are principally internal costs associated with separation of risk bearing, 
decision control and decision bearing, with the costs of market contracting are principally the 
costs of transacting in the market with internal (e.g. labour) and external (e.g. suppliers, 
customers) entities. Hansmann (1996) preserved the concept of the firm as a legal fiction 
separating patrons are separated into consumers and suppliers of labour, materials and capital 
(both equity and debt). Where shares in the firm are freely tradable, he contended that the most 
efficient ownership forms will emerge endogenously. If a less-efficient patron class owns the 
firm, then the more efficient interests will either take it over or create a more efficient firm that, 
through competition, will drive the less efficient one out of the market.  
In this vein, Hansmann (1996) contended that firms constrained by the non-distribution 
would emerge endogenously when the costs of maintaining individual ownership interests 
outweigh the costs of forgoing these interests.  These firms would instead rely upon individuals 
bound only by fiduciary duties to undertake control of the firm. He maintained a distinction 
between truly ‘non-owned’ firms and those (e.g. co-operatives, clubs and mutuals) where 
specific patrons held similar controlling interests to shareholder-owner patrons, even though 
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their claims on residual assets and income streams were somewhat attenuated.  For example, 
he distinguishes between co-operatives where supplier-members are the controlling interests 
(for example ‘supplier-controlled” co-operatives such as Independent Practitioner Associations 
co-ordinating firms of doctors providing primary healthcare) and those where consumers hold 
sway (“consumer-controlled” co-operatives such as a health clinic run by a trade union for its 
members, or a child care co-operative run by parents). This distinction is related to the duty of 
the decision-makers as fiduciaries to operate the firm in the specific interests of that patron 
group.   
Applying Hansmann’s reasoning, if the risks (losses) potentially arising as a 
consequence of the (incomplete) contracts between the affected stakeholders and the firm are 
sufficiently large, then one would expect the stakeholders to be able to resolve the problem by 
assuming ownership themselves. Accordingly, the right to appoint members of the decision 
control body emanates from their role as residual claimants, not as stakeholders in any other 
trading sense. But if, in the trade-off between costs and ownership, no ownership is the most 
efficient arrangement, then the governance arrangements of the non-owned firm should be 
aligned with the interests of beneficiary-patrons (either customers – e.g. patients – or suppliers 
– e.g. donors) who would otherwise have been the firm’s legal owners (Howell & Cordery, 
2013). 
By considering both the costs of ownership and the costs of market contracting, 
Hansmann’s schema for firm ownership coalesced the literature on agency theory used by 
Meckling, Fama and Jensen with the body of incomplete contracting literature deriving from 
Grossman and Hart (1986).  Grossman and Hart (1986) observed that contracts cannot specify 
all states of nature or all actions in advance (e.g. because agents are boundedly rational), 
recognising that some states of nature or actions cannot be verified by third parties ex post, and 
are therefore not ex ante contractible either. When a contract negotiated ex ante inevitably 
allows discretion over asset use, then the ‘owner’ is the party with the residual rights of control 
who decides how to fill the contractual ‘holes’ relating to the asset.  The optimal governance 
structure is one which maximises ex ante surplus given that contracts are incomplete.  When 
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contracts are unenforceable and ex post renegotiation must be relied upon to ‘fill the contractual 
holes’, the contractual incompleteness leads to efficiency losses.  Optimal governance 
arrangements – that specify the allocation of control rights to assets exposed by the incomplete 
contracts – will be those that provide the incentives that best minimise these losses.  
 Extensions of Gross and Hartman continue to provide insights into aspects of the 
theory of the firm, particularly addressing the question of vertical integration that first inspired 
the authors. Dessein (2014) identifies two strands addressing this question: one where 
noncontractible actions are treated in a similar fashion to ‘effort’ in the moral hazard literature; 
and one where the question of ‘who’ takes the noncontractible actions (owners, or their 
manager-agents) becomes a choice variable.   
Dessein (2014) surveys models where actions are never contractible, either ex ante or 
ex post, and building on Hart & Holmstrom (2010), offers a model where managers’ co-
ordination function rationalises the trade-off between agents’ motivation (favouring non-
integration) and co-ordination (favouring integration). Whilst integration allows owners to take 
advantage of co-ordination benefits, it worsens the information transfer from manager-agents 
to owner-principals, and inhibits adaptation to local knowledge observed only by the manager-
agents.  Aghion et al. (2014) distinguish between formal authority which can be allocated 
contractually, and real authority which resides in the better-informed party. This distinction 
helps explain the allocation of authority in multi-layer hierarchies, the relationship between 
delegation and trust, and the relationship between decentralization and characteristics such as 
the firm’s age, firm heterogeneity and the degree of competitiveness in the sector and how close 
to the technological frontier the firm is.  However, the models giving rise to these insights all 
presume the bundling of residual ownership and control, and the profit maximisation objective 
of the owner.  
For a fully comprehensive theory of the firm encompassing nonstandard firms to be 
developed, it would seem necessary to tease out the differences between the different elements 
of residual ownership and residual control in these firms, the contractibility (or otherwise) of 
the different rights, the objectives of the individuals on whom they are conferred and the 
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contractual interactions into which they enter. The firm should be considered not a nexus of 
contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but a nexus for contracts (Hansmann, 2008) where its 
boundaries are determined by the relative efficiency of allocating the separate and numerous 
residual rights of ownership and control to different parties (Evans et al., 2012). Indeed, one of 
the motivations for the formation of non-profit firms – the limits to the ability of third parties 
to assess service quality in ‘trust goods’ such as health care which is observed frequently in 
practice – is a non-ownership based strategic solution to a problem of noncontractibility when 
residual assets are negligible and information asymmetries prevail (Ben-Ner, 1986; Hansmann, 
1996). Whilst only recently acknowledged as an explicit strategic option (Glaeser & Schleifer, 
2001), it has sat at the core of the theory posited by Arrow (1963) to explain the non-profit 
objective observed by medical practitioners that is arguably as old as the medical profession 
itself.   
2.2 Rights to Assets and Income Streams 
Moving the theory of the firm onwards to account for firms with nonstandard ownership, it is 
necessary to examine first how ownership and control are divided and separately contracted.  
This allows us to identify how dimensions of non-ownership may affect bargaining behaviour 
when the effects of contractual incompleteness manifest themselves.  
Hart & Moore (1996) examine the co-operative form that was (at the time) commonly 
observed amongst stock exchanges. They note (p56) that the residual rights of control of the 
assets of exchanges are held “by the members, who take decisions democratically, on a one-
member-one-vote basis” even though the residual assets are commonly-held with no explicit 
residual claims, and annual residual earnings (profits) are disbursed in proportion to trading 
activity.Contractual arrangements are used to assign control rights in a different proportion to 
residual ownership claims, so that the markets for firm control are at variance to the markets 
for ownership of the residual assets and income streams.  Although the rights of residual control 
are not allocated proportionately vis-à-vis the distribution of income and assets, there is a direct 
correlation between ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ rights.  
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Where are the residual rights of control of the assets vested when firms have no owners? 
The self-evident answer is ‘nowhere’. In the first instance, all else held equal, the governance 
arrangements of non-owned firms must identify and explicitly contractually assign as many of 
the control rights as it is technically feasible. Ex ante assignment is necessary as it is not 
possible to assume that non-contracted control rights will automatically vest in the appropriate 
party when their value is revealed. Whereas it is axiomatic in owned firms that non-specified 
rights have clear owners which enables loose specifications (and hence flexibility in contracts), 
such flexibility is unwise in non-owned firms, as they lack owners to take responsibility for the 
future contracting of the rights that are revealed. Thus, both the governance arrangements and 
the contracts associated with contracting with non-owned firms will necessarily be more 
complex than observed in forms where ownership is clearly assigned. In the second instance, 
in firms with no owners, governors and managers will expend more resources to obtain effective 
control of these unassigned rights than in firms where these rights are clearly vested in defined 
owners. Thus there must be compelling benefits from forgoing an ownership stake in order to 
overcome contract failure – for the simple reason that it excludes the very possibility of 
unexpected outcomes that give rise to the problem. 
The expectation that much more explicit assignment is required of the various rights of 
control of the non-human assets in non-owned firms than in owned firms leads on naturally to 
a consideration of what those assets might be. Ben-Ner (1986) proposes a distinction between 
the residual control of the physical assets of a non-owned firm (e.g. buildings, plant, equipment, 
etc.) and the income streams they generated. In his view, the non-distribution constraint attends 
principally to the way in which the income streams are applied. The ownership of the assets 
need not be constrained to the same control and allocation arrangements as the income streams. 
This view is consistent with Hart and Moore’s ‘residual control of assets’ view, whereby the 
profits of co-operatives are disbursed to members in proportion to their custom with the firm, 
whilst the residual control rights over the firm’s assets may be exercised on the basis of 
membership or patronage.  
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The distinction between income streams and residual assets in co-operatives and non-profit 
firms is further illustrated by McKinlay (1999) in relation to the dilemmas facing co-operatives 
under demutualisation. Where the distribution of the residual assets in the event of the 
dissolution of an owned firm is clear (to shareholders in proportion to their shareholding), 
unless there is a clearly articulated dissolution arrangement in the formal governance 
arrangements of a non-owned or co-operative firm (i.e. the constitution), then it is not 
immediately evident how the proceeds should be divided, even if it has been clear how the 
income streams should have been distributed (e.g. in proportion to custom). Further, some 
cooperatives have an asset lock, where the members have no claim on the residual assets, but 
on dissolution the assets are transferred to another cooperative or non-profit entity. 
3. Towards A Governance Taxonomy  
There is a number of different dimensions along which the nature of the firm’s governance 
arrangements can be examined, determined by elements of the contracts of which comprising 
the firm. These dimensions lead towards a taxonomy of firm classifications, from which further 
insights can be gained to guide the normative task of governance design and the assessment of 
firm performance.  We take as a starting point Hart & Moore’s and Ben-Ner’s distinction 
between residual assets and income streams, and the difference between for-profit and non-
profit objectives to create Figure 1.  
11 
 
Figure 1: Locus of Residual Control Rights by Firm Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 The Ownership of Residual Risks 
Whereas the early Jensen, Meckling and Fama literature suggests the important distinctions are 
based on the separation of ownership and control, with shareholders being simply passive 
recipients, the Hansmann, Hart and Moore literature identifies that when the ownership of 
residual control of the assets which comprises the firm is vested in these shareholders, important 
differences arise. Whilst Hart and Moore have focused only on firms with defined ownership 
interests (shareholder-owned and co-operative firms), Hansmann identifies the case of a firm 
where there are no residual owners, and hence no owners – the classic ‘non-profit’. Ben-Ner 
(1986) identifies that (at the very least) there are two distinct sorts of assets to be considered: 
the future income streams (profits) and residual assets (plant, equipment and retained earnings). 
The first question to be asked when examining a firm is therefore whether there are defined 
owners of the residual control rights to the assets of the firm as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Standard for-profit firms with clearly defined owners of the residual control rights of 
both the income streams and residual assets, are shown in the top-right of Figure 1. By contrast, 
classic non-profit firms have no clearly defined owners of the residual control rights of the 
income streams or the residual assets, so sit at the bottom left. Sometimes firms are constituted 
with defined owners, but with a non-profit objective. They will sit on the top left of Figure 1: 
Income Streams 
Residual Assets 
No owners 
Defined 
owners  
Defined owners  
Limited liability 
For-profit 
Co-operative Non-profit 
Limited liability 
Non-profit 
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their defined owners (who may have contributed the assets of the firm initially, or stood as 
guarantors of loans) bear the residual financial risks and hence the residual control of those 
assets. However, the non-profit objective means that the firm’s decision controllers must 
operate in line with the same sorts of fiduciary duties which bind the decision controllers of 
non-profit firms. Hence the decision controllers are not claimants to the residual control of the 
profit streams, even though they may have claims on the assets. Completing the matrix are co-
operatives, on the bottom right of Figure 1. Co-operatives’ members bear the residual risks 
associated with the income streams (profits) so profits of co-operative firms are distributed to 
the defined owners, that is, the members. Typically, co-operatives have no specific claims 
identified to the residual assets so, like non-profit firms, their claims sit at the non-owned end 
of the spectrum.2 However, the more clearly specified these rights become, the closer the co-
operative moves towards the for-profit quadrant of the matrix in Figure 1.  
3.2 Which Stakeholders? 
Having identified the extent to which the relevant assets are ‘owned’, using Hansmann’s 
theories, we now identify which stakeholding interests we expect to exert the relevant 
ownership interests (or in their absence, who the beneficial interests would be). This leads to 
the addition of a third dimension to the matrix, where the owning/controlling interests can be 
vested in either suppliers to the firm (equity owners, labour, other raw inputs) or consumers, as 
in Figure 2.  
                                                     
2  As noted by Chaddad and Cook (2004), while the traditional co-operative model is often portrayed as being quite separately 
different from for-profit firms (and non-profit firms), a number of alternative models exist which could be described as being 
closer to for-profit or non-profit characterisations.  
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Figure 2: Locus of Residual Control Rights by Firm Type and Stakeholding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To illustrate the use of the three-dimensional matrix in Figure 23, we observe a co-operative 
structured to reflect the interests of its members as consumers (for example a co-operative 
which delivers Continuing Professional Development to medical practitioners) occupying the 
front right of the Figure 2 cube. If it is a supplier co-operative (for example a co-operative of 
General Practitioners (GPs) who sell their services with a GP practice), it will sit at the back 
right of the cube in Figure 2. In both cases, the co-operative members have no claim on residual 
assets, but benefit either from income streams directly, or from reduced costs as a result of 
belonging to the club/co-operative.  
Likewise, other firm types fit the cube in Figure 2. For example, a healthcare non-profit 
firm may be established to benefit the patients as consumers of services (e.g. a healthcare 
charity, bottom front left), or the doctors as suppliers (e.g. a professional association, bottom 
back left). In neither case are consumers or suppliers assumed to have any claim on residual 
assets or income streams.  
Finally, at the top left of Figure 2 are pictured supplier- and consumer- owned non-
profit firms. In this respect, the members have a claim on the assets. However, they are unlikely 
                                                     
3  Note that, where cooperatives without an asset lock will also be in the space at the top left of Figure 2. 
Suppliers
Consumer  
co-operative 
    Supplier 
non-profit 
firm 
Consumer 
non-profit 
firm 
    Supplier 
non-profit 
firm 
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non-profit 
firm 
Owned 
(limited 
liability) 
Consumer  
Owned  
(limited liability) 
Supplier  
Supplier  
co-operative 
Income Streams 
Residual Assets 
Defined owners  
Defined owners  
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Consumers 
For-profit  
firm 
14 
 
to have a claim on the income streams due to the non-profit motive. A for-profit firm is depicted 
at the top right of Figure 2 as suppliers or consumers have a claim on assets and income streams.   
3.3 The Degree and Instruments of Control 
The three dimensional matrix provides a framework to conceptualise firm location in a space 
that describes the locus of residual control. However, as Hart and Moore identify, effective 
ownership pertains to the residual rights that are not already contractually assigned. As 
governance arrangements are contracts which are specifically intended to allocate control 
rights, then by definition the residual control rights comprising ownership are those that are 
not subject to governance contracts. Thus, it is imperative to understand first what rights have 
been contractually allocated, and the instruments by which the degree of control is exercised. 
We propose that this can be viewed along a continuum (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Instruments Defining Income Streams and Residual Control Right Types in Firms: 
a Continuum 
No owners                                                                                                                 Defined owners 
Type (see 
Figure 2) 
Consumer or 
supplier non-
profit firm  
(e.g. charity) 
Non-profit firm or 
cooperative 
(supplier/ consumer) 
(e.g. club) 
Supplier or 
consumer 
cooperative 
Limited Liability 
company  
C
o
n
tro
l righ
ts 
Income 
Streams 
No definable 
claims nor 
control rights 
over either 
 
No claims 
Partially 
definable 
claims 
Definable 
claims over 
income if for-
profit 
Residual 
Assets 
Definable control 
rights 
Definable 
control rights 
Definable 
control rights 
Specified by: Governance 
instruments 
Individual 
(contractual) 
instruments 
Trading 
instruments 
Shareholding 
instruments 
 
The continuum in Figure 3 moves from a consumer non-profit with ‘no owners’ on the left, 
where there are no obvious residual owners of the firm’s assets, to a limited liability company 
with ‘defined owners’ on the right. Hence, both the residual owners’ identity, and the allocation 
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of the residual rights, are defined by the shareholding instrument. There is a range of 
increasingly well-defined instruments via which the control rights are specified.  
A non-owned firm (on the extreme left) has no legal owners. The lack of clarity about 
ownership increases the need to use of contractual instruments to specifically assign control 
rights relative to a firm with fully defined owners. We could expect that, all else held equal, the 
non-owned firm’s governance arrangements will rely much more strongly upon contracts than 
the owned firm (relying on alignment of share ownership and residual control), to ensure that 
the control rights are exercised in the interests of the beneficial owners.  
Moving to the right on Figure 3, the identification of a specific ownership interest, for 
example a supplier non-profit with defined members, reduces uncertainty relative to a charity 
where beneficial owners are identified as a population rather than specific individuals. Supplier 
non-profit members retain residual rights of control (from their membership), but in the non-
owned case, the allocation of the risks and control is based purely on the basis of 
member/voting. Residual control is now allocated through a crude contractual instruments and 
no direct nexus between control and the rights to residual assets or income streams.  
For a direct nexus between the control rights and beneficiary status, and further to the 
right in Figure 3, one can link the individual’s membership status with some other metric – for 
example, a trading activity. Trading is the individual’s market interaction with the firm, either 
as a consumer, or a supplier providing inputs. This structure is the classic consumer- or supplier-
owned cooperative firm. Whilst clarity about the residual control rights is greatly improved 
over the non-owned firm, a potential tension remains between the control exerted by 
membership interests and the trading instruments via which benefits are disbursed. Myers and 
Scott Cato (2011) note that the co-operative ownership model fits General Practitioner (GP) 
practices well, as these suppliers may exert greater control and influence over government 
funders as a cooperative than individually. Such a cooperative also allows GPs to provide 
around-the-clock cover for patients.    
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Ultimately, if the market interaction is to supply capital to the firm (as per Hansmann), then 
a position has been reached where control and residual benefit allocation have become perfectly 
united via the share instrument of shareholding (as shown on the right hand end of Figure 3).  
 
4. Applying the taxonomy: New Zealand’s primary healthcare reforms 
To assess the usefulness of this taxonomy for understanding the allocation of residual control 
amongst nonstandard firms, we examine the New Zealand primary healthcare reforms. In order 
to respond to its commitments under the Alma Ata Declaration (World Health Organization, 
1978), the New Zealand government instigated a Primary Health Care Strategy (King, 2001) in 
2002, substantially increasing funding to those non-profit providers that formed as Primary 
Health Organizations (PHOs). Equitable access and affordability for citizens were priorities for 
this funding which was based on a population-health basis with capitation and responding to 
community needs, rather than individual charges to patients. In addition, favouritism towards 
community control was indicated, as all PHOs were required to include both community and 
provider representatives on their governing boards. The impetus for the non-profit firm was to 
“ensure that funds for healthcare are not diverted into private profits” (King, 2002), There was 
no specific requirement that the firms have owners or not. Nor did the policy preclude the ability 
for non-profit PHOs to enter into contracts with for-profit providers for the delivery of care – 
indeed, this was anticipated to be the most likely scenario in order to ensure the ready supply 
of primary health care. Further, the reforms required PHOs to ‘include their communities in 
their governing processes’ with ‘all providers and practitioners … involved in the 
organization’s decision-making rather than one group being dominant’ (King, 2001, p.viii), 
thus suggesting that these PHOs trend towards consumer-controlled firms (or at least 
demonstrate a ‘mixed governance’ model where all stakeholders had apparently equal 
representation, so that none would be able to acquire effective control). 
Prior to the reforms, government primary health care funding principally subsidised the 
GP visits of lower socio-economic patients. A wide variety of organisational forms existed in 
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the New Zealand primary healthcare sector (as shown in Figures 4 and 5). The industry 
consisted mainly of self-employed GPs operating as for-profit businesses (at the right hand end 
of Figure 4), but due to funding incentives in the early 1990s, by 2002 (the effective date of the 
reforms), 84% of GPs were members of primary care organizations formed for the purposes of 
contracting with the Government. Of these 80% were also members of Independent Practitioner 
Associations (IPAs) (Controller and Auditor-General, 2002), supplier-controlled firms that 
enabled GPs to benefit from medical research, continuing professional development and, most 
importantly a vehicle through which GPs could jointly bargain with the government for 
contracted bulk funding and lobby for additional resources. Contemporaneously, 3% of GPs 
worked in primary care organizations contracting independently with the government, 15% in 
loose networks and 2% were in non-profit consumer-controlled firms (Controller and Auditor-
General, 2002). These latter organizations served comparatively homogeneous populations 
whose preferences differed from customers of self-employed GPS and included, for example, 
union and iwi4 health clinics with a strong non-profit focus (see centre and left of Figure 4). 
Further, consumer-controlled rural health clinics had developed where the costs of ownership 
for a rural GP were too high and the community took ownership of the rural practice, operating 
as charities in order to ensure continuation of a service in a remote area (left hand side of Figure 
4).  
Figure 4: Instruments of Residual Control Right Types - pre policy change 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4  Iwi is the Maori word that corresponds with the concept of a tribe. 
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As shown in Figure 5 (an extension of Figure 3), most IPAs operated as co-operatives, where 
the GPs were the customers of their services (mainly collective contracting for government 
contracts) in line with the model supported by Myers and Scott Cato (2011). 
Figure 5: Locus of Residual Control Rights and Stakeholding - pre policy change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PHOs created under the reforms accordingly emerged from the different firms 
existing prior to the policy’s enactment. The non-profit directive required that all PHOs be 
oriented on the left-hand side of Figure 1 (and Figure 4) and include a wide range of 
stakeholders in decision-making. This would therefore place them towards the front of Figure 
2 (and Figure 5) to include consumers as well as suppliers in governance. Those firms 
previously established as charities had few difficulties in adapting to the NZPHCS’s 
requirements, as they were non-profit already, and many had consumer and provider 
representation on their boards. This is shown by their position straddling the supplier-consumer 
continuum in Figure 5. The trade union co-operatives (union clinics) and iwi authorities already 
had strong consumer orientation. However, with defined ownership stakes in respect of income 
streams, co-operative unions could not form as PHOs directly. In most part, cooperatives 
resolved the funding issues by affiliating contractually with PHOs formed from other origins 
and maintaining separate operational control. Iwi quickly developed operational collaborations 
and maintained direct contractual relationship with government funders. 
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The taxonomy allow us to identify significant differences in the allocation of control 
that emerged in the PHOs formed to satisfy the strategy.  Even though they are subject to 
essentially the same government contracts, different allocations of the balance of residual 
control resulted in different understandings of what it means to be ‘non-profit’. The most 
significant changes following the reforms came in respect of the PHOs formed to affiliate 
(contract) with GPs. The IPAs were already established as (GP) consumer co-operatives, and 
were essentially non-profit. Nevertheless, in general, non-union and non-iwi GP practices 
(supplier cooperatives) did not fit the government requirement, as they were for-profit firms. 
As substantial increased funding was available to appropriately constituted PHOs, the rising 
competition from community-controlled PHOs, provided strong incentives for self-employed 
GPs to join or form PHOs as quickly as possible. Thus, many GPs encouraged IPAs to form 
‘non-profit’ supplier cooperatives to enable them to access funding, but continue to operate 
their businesses as before. However, traditionally GP Cooperatives “have a professional culture 
that may make alliances with community and consumer groups difficult to conceive, develop, 
and maintain” (Schlaff, 2005, p.833).  
As shown in Figure 6, most IPAs formed as charitable trusts, but with the allocation of 
control rights in large part reflecting their supplier origins. Hence they are positioned on the 
‘supplier’ side of Figure 6. However, a significant subset of IPAs formed as limited liability 
companies (albeit with non-profit objectives) with IPA members as shareholders (see top right 
of  Figure 6). Importantly, neither limited liability nor IPA Trusts engage in supplying care 
directly to patients, but persist with non-integrated contracting of care to GPs and other 
providers.  This is consistent with the observation that GPs owning non-contractible human and 
practice capital prefer for the most part not to integrate with other providers, but to retain control 
of the contracts that govern access to their funding.  
By comparison, the PHOs that have formed around consumer-oriented iwi Trusts and 
local Charitable Trusts are more likely to be operating as integrated care provider entities, hiring 
doctors and nurses as employees and directly contracting with the government entities for 
funding. In part, these firms supply care in geographic locations where there is a ‘missing 
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market’ for GPs (e.g. rural locations) or to specific customer groups requiring care delivered in 
a specific way that limits the scope of GP practice such that GPs are reluctant to develop the 
specific human capital unless employed (e.g. care to specific ethnic groups).  
 
Figure 6: Locus of Residual Control Rights and Stakeholding in non-profit PHOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Despite the variety observed in Figure 6, we argue that the reforms intended  PHOs to 
have an organisational form that positioned them on the left hand side of Figure 6 as non-owned 
non-profit or limited liability non-profit firms, hence our argument that  the policy did not 
achieve its aim. Instead of consumer- or mixed-governance where all stakeholder had 
apparently equal representation (King, 2001) Table 1 shows a predominance of supplier-
managed firms rather than a variety of decision makers as the policy required. Table 1 provides 
a snapshot of the percentage of board members that represent GP/supplier interests in all of the 
PHOs (which are listed in Appendix 1).  It can be seen that supplier and mixed-origin PHOs 
have, on average, 60% more GPs/suppliers involved in governance, than consumer origin 
PHOs. We argue that, by failing to consider the residual rights (the form), and by concentrating 
only on structure (a non-profit) the PHC reforms have missed a vital opportunity to meet their 
goals to stop diversion of government funds to private profits and to engage a wide diversity of 
stakeholders in governance. 
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Table 1: Percentage of board members representing supplier (GP) interests 
 
Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of the PHOs by consumer-type and by producer-
type. This shows that consumer-origin non-owned non-profit firms outnumber the owned non-
profit firms and over 90% of the New Zealand population is registered to receive services 
through an IPA-origin (supplier-focused) PHO. However, in terms of producer-origin firms, 
while the number and reach of non-owned non-profit firms is greater than the owned non-profit 
firms, the power of the latter is likely to be greater, as a small number of firms have the majority 
of patients. 
 Whilst the NZPHCS required PHOs to be established as non-profit organisations so as 
to “ensure that funds for healthcare are not diverted into private profits” (King, 2002), the extent 
to which the effective control of PHOs is vested in supplier-oriented entities contracting with 
for-profit GPs is unlikely to have achieved this objective. Instead, with effective control biased 
towards suppliers, then residual control is also likely biased in that direction. The analysis 
suggests that, instead of specifying a non-profit objective function, and in order to direct 
government funds towards healthcare provided to patients, it would have been more useful to 
have specified an ownership restriction (e.g. requiring consumer-oriented firms) or imposed 
governance controls limiting the influence of a specific group of stakeholders (e.g. suppliers).  
 The union co-operatives present an interesting anomaly. Whilst strongly consumer-
oriented, and arguably well-positioned to integrate government contracting with care delivery, 
they have for the most part remained as stand-alone care providers, contracting with IPA-PHOs 
for their funding.  Although these arrangements may appear to dilute consumers’ interests at 
the PHO decision-making table, they were likely too small in size to manage the contracting 
 Consumer Origin Supplier Origin Mixed Origin 
Average 28.6% 46.1% 45.8% 
Lowest 0% 30% 14% 
Highest 50% 75% 78% 
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required of PHOs. Hence they have compromised by joining PHOs, but such cooperatives have 
not compromised their unique character when it comes to governing their own firms, 
maintaining their unique care provider character. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper was motivated by the dearth of Organizational Economics research into nonstandard 
entities (highlighted by Gibbons & Roberts, 2012) and the need to provide a framework for 
identifying differences in residual ownership and control (as identified by Aghion et al., 2014). 
The paper has analysed prior literature on the theory of the firm and the related governance 
arrangements that inform us about the arrangements for governing and contracting with firms 
having nonstandard ownership. While Berle and Means (1932) limited their discussion to for-
profit (publicly listed) firms, the greatest number of organizations are small and there is a great 
variety of different ownership models in this current age. Jensen and Meckling (1976) focused 
on the contractual exchange within the firm, but were unable to explain why firms would arise 
with no owners. Nevertheless, Fama and Jensen’s (1983a, 1983b) arguments of the need to 
separate decision-making from decision implementation (management and governance) can be 
applied more broadly than merely for-profit firms.  
The incomplete contracting framework proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
extended in recent years sheds a great deal of light on particular issues relating to firms: notably, 
the extent to which activities will be integrated within them, and the extent to which control 
will be centralised and controlled by residual claimants, or decentralised and entrusted to 
managers.  However, this literature presumes that residual control is exerted by residual owners.  
It does not explain why some firms have nonstandard ownership arrangements, and allocate 
residual control to individuals with no or constrained ownership stakes.  Particularly, it does 
not provide a good explanation for classic non-owned non-profit firms.  
Hansmann (1996; 2008. 2012), building on both the agency theory and incomplete 
contracting theories of the firm, suggests that the most efficient organisational form (for-profit, 
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co-operative or non-profit) will evolve endogenously, depending on contractual arrangements 
and the costs of these. However, Hart and Moore (1990, 1996, 1999) argue that transaction 
costs can provide a partial theory only due to the inability to contract all of a firm’s 
requirements, while Evans, et al. (2012) maintain the boundaries of a firm are determined by 
the efficiency of allocating the residual rights of control to different parties.   
In this paper we have extended these arguments and those of Hart and Moore (1996) 
and Ben-Ner (1986), which analysed different ways in which nonstandard firms contract 
differently for different assets. Specifically we have considered residual control of assets and 
income streams to derive a taxonomy of governance for managing these residual risks. In 
particular, we have considered which stakeholders may be important (consumers or suppliers) 
and also the types of instruments that would be used in this control continuum. We have 
illustrated the taxonomy with an example from primary healthcare in New Zealand, where, 
prior to reforms, a variety of firm-types existed.  
However, following reforms that required PHOs to be non-profit making and to include 
diverse stakeholders in decision-making, these firms coalesced mainly into non-owned types 
(as also evident in the UK – Allen et al., 2011). As such, control is either in the hands of the 
consumer or the hands of the supplier. When suppliers are governors, they are more likely to 
manage the income flows so as to extract profits for the suppliers. This is at odds to the 
requirement of the reforms to stop public funds being diverted to private profits (King, 2001); 
it is also less likely that consumers will be actively involved in decision-making as required 
under the reforms. We argue that this outcome has not achieved the reform’s aims. A non-profit 
objective alone is no substitute for a consumer co-operative structure which appeared to be the 
aim of the policy change. Indeed, by relying on governance instruments, where decision-makers 
have no pecuniary interest (control rights or definable claims), it is far from clear how any ex 
post negotiation will reliably reflect the interests of suppliers, consumers or the funder, unless 
it was anticipated ex ante.   
As noted, Ben-Ner (1986) states that non-profit organizations are more likely to operate 
in trust goods such as health, and Allen et al. (2011) agree that government prefers to fund 
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them.  It is expected that non-profit providers will deliver higher quality services to unprofitable 
patients (Allen et al., 2011, Kanaya et al., 2015), yet in Japan, patients do not perceive 
citizen(consumer)-driven non-profit providers to be as reliable as for-profit providers. On the 
contrary, Allen et al. (2011) notes that the UK National Health Service seeks to support start-
up client(consumer)-led non-profit providers to provide diversity. However, there is no analysis 
of their performance compared to for-profit providers (Allen et al., 2011). 
In this paper we have drawn out not just the consumer/supplier split between providers, 
but also whether the organization has owners or not. This theoretical extension could be used 
to empirically analyse contracting out in health care. Specifically, does performance (service 
and/or financial) differ depending on who leads the non-profit provider - the consumer or 
supplier? Further, does performance (service and/or financial) differ depending on whether the 
provider has owners or not? 
While the case study offered in this paper may be limited contextually to the New 
Zealand health care sector, we suggest that the taxonomy developed here enables more 
structured and principled empirical analysis of how nonstandard allocation of residual control 
and ownership may play out in both for-profit and non-profit firms, under the assumptions of 
both agency and contractual incompleteness theories of the firm. We believe that the taxonomy 
provides a means of classifying firms to enable large-scale empirical analysis to be undertaken 
that have so far eluded scholars of incomplete contracting.  We hypothesise that performance 
will differ and that it is evident from our case study that policy-makers and funders should be 
aware of these differences. This would enable them to define the governance arrangements 
which they are prepared to regulate and fund.  Organizational owners will also seek more 
granular information to be sure that their organizational structures are suitable for the 
performance sought.  We contend that the taxonomy enables further empirical analysis because 
it allows researchers to control for many of the subtle between-firm distinctions that have 
historically limited the use of this approach.  
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APPENDIX 1: PHO Origins 2003-2004 
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Consumer Origins* 
Non-owned Non-profit #Enrollees Owned Non-profit # Enrollees 
AuckPAC Health Trust Board 30,044 Horowhenua PHO Ltd 23,843 
Coast to Coast PHO  11,910 Porirua Health Plus Limited 12,857 
Hauora Hokianga Integrated PHO 6,633 Tararua PHO Limited 15,882 
Hauraki PHO 7,199 Te Tai Tokerau PHO Ltd 41,468 
Hurunui Kaikoura PHO 12,278 Tumai mo te Iwi Inc 45,056 
Kaipara Care Incorporated 12,008 
  
Langimalie Health Clinic Tongan  6,039 
  
Mangere Community Health Trust 11,827 
  
Maori PHO Coalition 7,328 
  
Nga Mataapuna Oranga 8,685 
  
Ngati Porou Hauora Incorporated 12,579 
  
North Waikato PHO 8,878 
  
Otaki Primary Health Organisation Trust 5,975 
  
Peoples Healthcare Trust 5,935 
  
Piki te Ora ki Te Awakairangi 12,248 
  
Ropata Community PHO 16,186 
  
South East & City PHO 9,543 
  
Tamati Whangai PHO 4,563 
  
TaPasefika Health Trust 18,768 
  
Taumata Hauora Trust 5,492 
  
Te Ao Hou Primary Health Organisation 7,176 
  
Te Kupenga A Kahu Trust 6,870 
  
Te Kupenga O Hoturoa Charitable Trust 19,364 
  
Te Tihi Hauora o Taranaki 6,140 
  
Tihewa Mauriora Charitable Trust 8,729 
  
Tipaka Moana PHO Trust 6,523 
  
Wairoa District Charitable Health Trust 8,630 
  
Wangaroa Primary Health Organisation 318 
 
  
Total Enrollees 277,868 
 
139,106 
Total Enrollees in consumer origin Non-profit                                        416,974 
Producer Origins* 
Canterbury Community PHO 5,082 Auckland PHO Ltd 15,636 
Capital PHO 127,559 Central Otago PHO Ltd  37,837 
East Health Trust 69,851 Dunedin City PHO Ltd 79,065 
Eastern and Northern Southland PHO 16,920 Eastern Bay of Plenty PHO Ltd 31,463 
HealthWest 149,365 Hawkes Bay PHO Ltd 131,336 
Kapiti PHO 33,219 Lake Taupo PHO Ltd 33,821 
Karori PHO Trust 12,668 Marlborough PHO Ltd  38,379 
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Kawerau Interim PHO 7,208 Nelson-Tasman PHO Ltd 86,577 
Manaia Health PHO 74,244 Pinnacle Incorporated 47,371 
MidValley Access PHO 20,319 Procare Network Auckland Ltd 305,674 
Mornington PHO 14,595 Procare Network Manukau Ltd 260,039 
Waiora Healthcare Trust 10,652   
Wairarapa Community PHO Trust 37,159   
Wakatipu PHO 11,644   
West Coast PHO 25,396   
Western Bay of Plenty PHO 125,836   
Whanganui Regional PHO 47,760   
Total Enrollees 1,833,777  1,442,328 
Total Enrollees in producer-origin Non-profit                                   3,276,105 
Notes: * The allocation of PHOs into consumer and supplier as well as owned and non-owned has been 
undertaken as accurately as possible in light of the data available.  
Source: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Health (2005). [Online]. Available at 
www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_index/-Primary+Health+Care+Establis hed+PHOS.   
 
